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THE NEED FOR CLEAR STRUCTURE IN "PLAIN
LANGUAGE" LEGAL DRAFTING
Layman E. Allen*
C. Rudy Engholm**
Language is not simple. To pretend otherwise is to mislead. In
practice the aspect that is handled most ineptly in written legal
materials is the structure. The focus of this article is upon struc-
ture and how to improve it. At the outset, let one thing be abso-
lutely clear. In seeking to achieve clarity of expression, those
who have no more to recommend than short sentences, simple
words, and readability formulas are offering a cracker in circum-
stances where a full gourmet feast is gleaming in the chef's eye
for those with the wit but to ask for the menu. To practice their
craft competently, legal drafters must gain control of the rele-
vant intellectual skills. One such skill is facility in using some of
the elementary techniques and knowledge of modern logic to
achieve structure that is clear. While modern logic is not the
only intellectual tool that is relevant for this purpose, it is the
only one that is dealt with here. Linguists and others can more
persuasively argue their own cases elsewhere. The examples
presented here illustrate the usefulness of understanding mod-
ern logic for achieving clarity in legal drafting.
Four kinds of structure and examples of each will be ex-
amined first: the structure between parts within the same sen-
tence, the structure between constituent sentences within the
same sentence, the structure between parts that are in different
sentences, and the structure between constituent sentences that
are in different sentences. Second, the results of an experiment
on the New York consumer protection statute that requires clar-
ity in various legal documents of importance to consumers will
be reported. The embarrassing outcome shows that the statute
* Professor of Law and Research Scientist, University of Michigan Law School.
** Research Attorney, University of Michigan.
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suffers from the very ills that it seeks to cure. Third, the perva-
siveness of structural ambiguity will be illustrated by the word
"unless," whose surprising slipperiness is all too typical of the
hundreds of other little words that are commonly used in legal
discourse to indicate structure. Finally, the article considers the
usefulness of simplifying and standardizing the words used to
indicate structure by stipulating a small set of primitive terms
and defining all others in terms of them.
I. FOUR KINDS OF CLEAR STRUCTURE NECESSARY FOR PLAIN
LANGUAGE
To achieve clarity, short sentences and simple words can be
helpful, but they alone are not enough to do the job. It is also
necessary to pay close attention:
(1) to the structure within a sentence by which a part of
that sentence is related
(a) to other parts of that sentence or
(b) to constituent sentences within that sentence, and
(2) to the structure within a sentence by which a con-
stituent sentence of that sentence is related to other con-
stituent sentences of that sentence, and
(3) to the structure between two or more sentences by
which a part of one of those sentences is related
(a) to parts of another sentence or
(b) to constituent sentences within those other sen-
tences, and
(4) to the structure between two or more sentences by
which one of those sentences (or one of the constituent
sentences within it) are related to those other sentences
(or constituent sentences within them).
For convenience of reference, these four kinds of structure will
be referred to here as PW, PB, SW, and SB structures, as sum-
marized in Table 1.
[VOL. 13:3
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Table 1
Four Kinds of Structures
Parts Sentences
PW SW Within
Structure Structure
PB SBPB SBBetween
Structure Structure B
A significant example of an ambiguity in the first kind of
structure (PW) occurs in the first sentence of section 22(c) of
the Health Security Act bill introduced by Senator Edward M.
Kennedy.' It reads as follows:
(c) Psychiatric (mental health) service to an outpa-
tient is a covered service (1) only if it constitutes an ac-
tive preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, or rehabilitative
service with respect to emotional or mental disorders,
and (2) only (A) if the service is furnished by a group
practice organization, by a hospital, or by a community
mental health center or other mental health clinic which
furnishes comprehensive mental health services, or (B) if
the service is furnished to a patient of a day care service
with which the Board has an agreement under section
49(a)(3), or (C) to the extent of twenty consultations dur-
ing a benefit period (as defined in regulations), if the ser-
vice is furnished otherwise than in accordance with
clause (A) or (B).
The PW structural ambiguity occurs in the third constituent
sentence of this provision, that is, "the service is furnished by a
group practice organization, by a hospital, or by a community
mental health center or other mental health clinic which fur-
nishes comprehensive mental health services, . . ." As the sen-
tence is written the structure between some of the parts is left
implicit. It is unstated and unclear whether the sentence-part
"which furnishes comprehensive mental health services" is in-
tended to modify only the sentence-part "other mental health
clinic" or whether it is intended to modify some or all of the
other named types of organizations as well. There are three pos-
sible alternative interpretations, each of which is stated below
S.3, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977).
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with the exact same sequence of words as the present version,
but with the structure explicitly indicated by some conventions
in indenting and labeling the left margin.
Interpretation 1
the service is furnished
(a) by a group practice organization,
(b) by a hospital, or
(c) by a
-community mental health center or
-other mental health clinic which furnishes
comprehensive mental health services;
Interpretation 2
the service is furnished
(a) by a group practice organization,
(b) by a hospital, or
(c) by a
-community mental health center or
-other mental health clinic
which furnishes comprehensive mental health
services;
Interpretation 3
the service is furnished
(a) by a group practice organization,
(b) by a hospital, or
(c) by a community mental health center or other
mental health clinic
which furnishes comprehensive mental health services.
The broadest interpretation in the sense of qualifying the ser-
vices of most organizations as potentially covered services is In-
terpretation 1. It qualifies the services of group practice organi-
zations, hospitals, and community mental health centers as
potentially covered services even though those organizations do
not furnish comprehensive mental health services. On the other
hand, the narrowest interpretation (3) requires each of the four
types of organizations mentioned to furnish comprehensive
mental health services in order for their services to qualify as
potentially covered services. In between is Interpretation 2,
which allows services of group practice organizations and hospi-
[VOL. 13:3
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tals (but not community mental health.centers) to qualify with-
out their furnishing comprehensive mental health services.
Clearly the first three types of organizations-both those that
do, and those that do not, furnish comprehensive mental health
services-are vitally interested in which of the three interpreta-
tions is the appropriate one; billions of dollars worth of services
turn on the outcome. More importantly, the choice of whether
such a decision should be made legislatively, administratively, or
judicially is a choice that should in fact be made knowingly and
deliberately rather than arising accidentally by an ambiguity oc-
curring inadvertently or through lack of drafting skill. Familiar-
ity with modern logic would enhance the probability that such
choices are made deliberately and implemented skillfully.
The rest of this first sentence of section 22(c), which is herein-
after referred to as section 22(c).1, also illustrates sloppy struc-
ture of another kind that is embarrassingly typical of the convo-
luted and awkward style that characterizes so much of federal
statutory and regulatory provisions. The way that its other four
sentences relate to this third sentence and to each other is a
mind-mixing confluence of unnecessary ambiguity, complexity,
and opaqueness in the structure of the second kind (SW). To
emphasize the havoc that the drafter has wrought, let the con-
stituent sentences be abbreviated by underlined small letters as
follows:
a Psychiatric (mental health) service to an outpatient is
a covered service
b it constitutes an active preventive, diagnostic, thera-
peutic, or rehabilitative service with respect to emotional
or mental disorders
c the service is furnished by a group practice organiza-
tion, by a hospital, or by a community mental health
center or other mental health clinic which furnishes com-
prehensive mental health services
d the service is furnished to a patient of a day care ser-
vice with which the Board has an agreement under sec-
tion 49(a)(3)
a.1 to the extent of twenty consultations during a bene-
fit period (as defined in regulations)
e the service is furnished otherwise than in accordance
with clause (A) or (B).
Then, the between-sentence structure of section 22(c).1 as writ-
ten shows up more clearly as:
SPRING 19801
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(c) a (1) only if b, and (2) only (A) if c,
or (B) if d, or (C) a.1, if e,
where a.1 is a sentence-part
that qualifies a.
The structure is even more evident if the left margin is con-
trolled systematically as follows:
(c) a (1) only if b, and
(2) only
(A) if c, or
(B) if d, or
(C) a.1, if e.
Whatever relations were intended between sentences a through
e, they could have been expressed simply and in a standardized
straightforward manner by using the terms "if," "and," "or,"
and "not" more systematically. But the drafter's lack of skill
and innocence in making full use of his or her freedom in ex-
pressing the structure in a manner pregnant with ambiguity has
left many unnecessary questions:
Q1. Which is intended by: a(1) only if b, ..
1) if not b then not a, and if b then a,
or merely
.2) if not b then not a?
Q2. Which is intended by: a(1) only if b, and (2) only
(A) if c,. .?
1) a only if b, and a only if c,
or merely
2) a only if b and c?
Q2.1 If 1 is the answer to Q2, which is intended by that
answer?
1) If not b then not a, and if b then a, and
if not c then not a, and if c then a,
or merely
2) If not b then not a, and if not c then not a?
Q2.2 If 2 is the answer to Q2, which is intended by that
answer?
1) If not b or not c then not a, and
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if b and c then a,
or merely
2) if not b or not c then not a?
Q3. Which is intended by: a. . . (2) only (A) if c, or (B)
if d,. ..
1) a... onlyifcord,
or merely
2) a . . . only if c, ora. . . onlyif d?
Q3.1 If 1 is the answer to Q3, which is intended by that
answer?
1) If not c and not d then not a, and
if c or d then a,
or merely
2) If not c and not d then not a?
Q3.2 If 2 is the answer to Q3, which is intended by that
answer?
1) (If not c then not a, and if c then a) or
(if not d then not a, and if d then a),
or merely
2) If not c then a, or if not d then a?
Q4. Which is intended by: a. . . (2) only. . . (C)a.1, if
e?
1) a-only-a.1 if e,
or
2) a-a.1 only if e? (in light of a. only if c, or...
if d)
These are by no means all of the ambiguities in the relations
intended between the constituent sentences of section 22(c).1,
but they are certainly enough to give the flavor of the mess that
the drafter's choice of structural words has left for readers to
ponder. For what useful purpose would such chaos be deliber-
ately constructed? The most likely explanation in this case and
other similar ones is inadvertence or ineptitude, or both. The
resulting uncertainty, probably entirely unintended, leaves read-
ers to scrutinize the semantic content of the sentences a through
e to try to puzzle out the intended relationships-and if that
fails, to engage in utterly unnecessary historical legislative and
other legal research to discern which interpretations are most
appropriate. It is reminiscent of the mindless Humpty-Dumpty
mentality that uses the digit "7" to represent the number seven
SPRING 19801
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on one occasion, to represent the number thirty-two on another,
to represent the number four and six-tenths on a third occasion,
and to represent still others on other occasions-whatever is
most appropriate in the context. Instead of using the signs that
have been stipulated by consensus as the appropriate ones for
use in indicating the designated numbers, the mindless Humpty-
drafter has his own private codes and depends upon the context
to determine what his chosen set of signs means. No sensible
person would defend such a practice for communicating about
numbers. Yet, that is precisely what legal drafters persist in do-
ing in handling the structure of their written communications.
They are seemingly innocent and unaware of the fact that some
aspects of messages can be indicated with a degree of precision
and exactness similar to that of numerical relationships. It bears
repeating: to competently practice their craft, legal drafters
must gain control of the relevant intellectual skills. What the
drafter probably intended by section 22(c).1 was the following:
1. If
A. psychiatric (mental health) service to an outpa-
tient constitutes an active preventive, diagnos-
tic, therapeutic, or rehabilitative service with
respect to emotional or mental disorders,
then
B. if
1) the service is furnished
(a) by a group practice organization, or
(b) by a hospital, or
(c) by a community mental health center
or other mental health clinic which
furnishes comprehensive mental
health services, or
2) the service is furnished to a patient of a
day care service with which the board has
an agreement under section 49(a)(3),
then
3) the service is a covered service, and
C. if
1) the service is furnished otherwise than in
accordance with provision 1B1 or provision
1B2,
then
2) the service is a covered service only to the
extent of twenty consultations during a
benefit period (as defined in regulations),
and
[VOL. 13:3
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2. if
A. none of the sets of sufficient conditions set
forth in provision 1 for reaching result 1B3 or
result 1C2 are fulfilled,
then
B. the service is not a covered psychiatric (mental
health) service to an outpatient.
This interpretation of the structure of section 22(c).1 is simple
and straightforward. Schematically, it is:b
L- a-- -
L P--- Nd.
This interpretation indicates that there are
two alternative sets of sufficient conditions for reaching
result d-namely, set a and b and set a and c, and
one set of sufficient conditions for reaching result f-
namely, set a and e, and
one sufficient condition for reaching result Nd-namely
g.
Whatever interpretation of the structural relationships be-
tween the constituent sentences of section 22(c).1 is intended,
whether or not it is the one shown above, that intended inter-
pretation can be represented by a statement with structure as
precise, exact, and unambiguous as the one above. Competent
legal drafters should have the skill of expressing the between-
sentence structure of their texts with such precision, such exact-
ness, and such lack of ambiguity for use whenever it is deemed
prudent so to express the structure. Those charged with the re-
sponsibility of drafting statutes and regulations should have the
opportunity to become familiar with the relevant knowledge of
modern logic.
So much for the structure within sentences (PW and SW).
Now let us turn to the structure between sentences (PB and
SB). Short sentences will tend to minimize the likelihood that
drafters inadvertently incorporate ambiguity in the within-sen-
tence structure of the documents that they write. The effect,
however, is not all one way nor all in the positive direction. It
usually is a trade-off situation. Shorter sentences usually mean
SPRING 1980]
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more sentences, and as the number of sentences increases, the
likelihood increases that the drafter will inadvertently incorpo-
rate ambiguity in the between-sentence structure or increase the
complexity of the document by failing to express the structure
that relates the ideas expressed in the separate sentences. When
structure is left implicit, readers must figure it out from context,
which only makes it harder to understand. Increased complexity
and more between-sentence ambiguity do not necessarily accom-
pany shortened sentence length and more sentences. Rather,
they are merely the likely results for drafters who are amateurs
in the use of logic.
Those who gain familiarity with modern logic will have attain-
ment of the ideal within their grasp: short constituent sentences
with between-sentence structure indicated explicitly and pre-
cisely. They will not be subject to the confinements of short
sentences but will know how to assemble book-length sentences
that will be models of clarity. Flexibility will characterize the
drafters who know their logic in the way that an expert typist
knows which fingers to depress-intuitively and immediately
and without pausing to think about it. When the relevant intel-
lectual skills are under control, drafters will become more com-
petent. They will better manage the structure of the third kind
(PB), which is illustrated in sections 3-201 and 3-202 of the
Model Procurement Code.2 The relevant parts read as follows:
Sec. 1. Except as otherwise authorized by law, all State
contracts shall be awarded by:
(1) competitively sealed bidding;
(2) competitive negotiation;
(3) noncompetitive negotiation; or
(4) small purchase procedures.
Sec. 2. Contracts exceeding the amount provided by
section 6 shall be awarded by competitive sealed
bidding unless it is determined in writing that
this method is not practicable.
The structural relationship between the sentence-part "Ex-
cept as otherwise authorized by law" in section 1 and the first
sentence of section 2 has been left implicit in the present ver-
sion. Readers must determine for themselves from the semantic
contents of the sentences of the two sections that the condition
' MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE §§ 3-201 & -202 (2d Draft, 1977).
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expressed by this sentence-part is meant to be a condition for
the result expressed in section 2 as well as for the result ex-
pressed in section 1. A drafter sensitive to the problems of be-
tween-sentence structure could have easily made the relation-
ships explicit by a synthesis of the two sections as follows:
If
1. it is not otherwise authorized by law,
then
2. all State contracts shall be awarded by:
(A) competitive sealed bidding,
(B) competitive negotiation,
(C) noncompetitive negotiation, or
(D) small purchase procedures, and
3. if
A. it is not determined in writing that competitive
sealed bidding is not practicable,
then
B. contracts exceeding the amount provided by sec-
tion 6 shall be awarded by competitive sealed
bidding.
The arrow-diagram of the provision would be:
>-- a i-L---- -
r -- c ---.. d.
In this "normalized" version of the provision in which the struc-
ture between sentences is explicit and precise, as well as stan-
dardized and simplified, it is clear that result b occurs when con-
dition a is fulfilled and result d occurs when conditions a and c
are fulfilled.
The example involving structure of the fourth kind (SB), in
which the relationships involved are between constituent
sentences of different sentences, is considerably more complex.
It will facilitate and simplify discussion of this example if both
the present version and the normalized version are available for
reference. The example is New York's pioneering "Plain Lan-
guage" statute that has been heralded as making "legalese illegal
in consumer contracts." The version of the statute used in the
3 N.Y. GEN. OL. LAWS § 5-702 (McKinney 1978). The experiments with the New York
Plain Language provisions were done on the version that was scheduled to become effec-
SPRING 1980]
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experiments provides:
b. Every written agreement entered into after June
first, nineteen hundred seventy-eight, for the lease of
space to be occupied for residential purposes, or to which
a consumer is a party wherein the money, property or
service which is the subject of the transaction is prima-
rily for personal, family or household purposes must be:
1. Written in non-technical language and in a clear co-
herent manner using words with common and every day
meanings;
2. Appropriately divided and captioned by its various
sections.
Any creditor, seller or lessor who fails to comply with
the foregoing provisions of this subdivision shall be liable
to a consumer who is a party to a written agreement gov-
tive with respect to written agreements entered into after June 1, 1978. This version did
not include the final amendments that were added before the statute became effective
for written agreements entered into after November 1, 1978. From the viewpoint of the
structural problems analyzed here, the final version is essentially the same. It provides:
§ 5-702. REQUIREMENTS FOR USE OF PLAIN LANGUAGE IN CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS.
a. Every written agreement entered into after November first, nineteen hun-
dred seventy-eight, for the lease of space to be occupied for residential purposes,
or to which a consumer is a party and the money, property or service which is
the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household pur-
poses must be:
1. Written in a clear and coherent manner using words with common and
every day meanings;
2. Appropriately divided and captioned by its various sections.
Any creditor, seller or lessor who fails to comply with this subdivision shall
be liable to a consumer who is a party to a written agreement governed by this
subdivision in an amount equal to any actual damages sustained plus a penalty
of fifty dollars. The total class action penalty against any such creditor, seller or
lessor shall not exceed ten thousand dollars in any class action or series of class
actions arising out of the use by a creditor, seller or lessor of an agreement
which fails to comply with this subdivision. No action under this subdivision
may be brought after both parties to the agreement have fully performed their
obligation under such agreement, nor shall any creditor, seller or lessor who at-
tempts in good faith to comply with this subdivision be liable for such penalties.
This subdivision shall not apply to agreements involving amounts in excess of
fifty thousand dollars nor prohibit the use of words or phrases or forms of
agreement required by state or federal law, rule or regulation or by a govern-
mental instrumentality.
b. A violation of the provisions of subdivision a of this section shall not
render any such agreement void or voidable nor shall it constitute:
1. A defense to any action or proceeding to enforce such agreement; or
2. A defense to any action or proceeding for breach of such agreement.
c. In addition to the above, whenever the attorney general finds that there
has been a violation of this section, he may proceed as provided in subdivision
twelve of section sixty-three of the executive law.
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erned by the provisions thereof in an amount equal to
the sum of any actual damages sustained plus fifty dol-
lars. The total class action penalty against any such cred-
itor, seller or lessor shall not exceed ten thousand dollars.
These penalties may be enforced only in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, but not after both parties to the
agreement have fully performed their obligation under
such agreement, nor against any creditor, seller or lessor
who attempts in good faith to comply with this section.
This subdivision shall not apply to agreements involving
amounts in excess of fifty thousand dollars.
c. A violation of the provisions of subdivision b of this
section shall not render any such agreement void or void-
able nor shall it constitute:
1. A defense to any action or proceeding to enforce such
agreement; or
2. a defense to any action or proceeding for breach of
such agreement.
There are at least eighteen structural relationships between
the various sentences of this present version of the New York
Plain Language statute that are left implicit in the sense that
there is no structural language in the provision that explicitly
links each result expressed to the conditions that must be ful-
filled in order for that result to occur. Throughout this article it
has been asserted that leaving structural relationships implicit,
to be figured out from the context, tends to result in documents
that are both more complex and more ambiguous. The perform-
ance of representative groups of readers in carefully controlled
experiments is strong evidence for these claims. These experi-
ments with the New York Plain Language statute will be consid-
ered in the next section.
Before that, it will be helpful to examine the normalized ver-
sion of this statute in which eighteen of the between-sentence
structural relationships, which were left implicit in the present
version, have been made explicit and precise in the process of
normalizing the statute.
If
A. a written agreement entered into after June first,
nineteen seventy-eight,
(1) is for the lease of space to be occupied for resi-
dential purposes, or
(2) is one to which a consumer is a party wherein
SPRING 1980]
HeinOnline  -- 13 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 467 1979-1980
Journal of Law Reform
the money, property or service which is the
subject of the transaction is primarily for per-
sonal, family or household purposes, and
B. that agreement does not involve an amount in excess
of fifty thousand dollars,
then
C. that agreement must be written in non-technical
language and in a clear and coherent manner using
words with common and every day meanings, and
D. that agreement must be appropriately divided and
captioned by its various sections, and
E. if
(1) a creditor, seller or lessor fails to comply with
provision C or provision D, and
(2) that creditor, seller or lessor does not attempt in
good faith to comply with this section, and
(3) one of the parties to the agreement has not yet
fully performed his obligations under such
agreement,
then
(4) that creditor, seller or lessor shall be liable to a
consumer who is a party to a written agreement
governed by the provisions thereof in an amount
equal to the sum of any actual damages sus-
tained plus fifty dollars, and
(5) the total class action penalty against any such
creditor, seller or lessor shall not exceed ten
thousand dollars, and
(6) these penalties may be enforced only in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and
(7) the violation resulting from that failure to
comply
(A) shall not render any such agreement void or
voidable, and
(B) shall not constitute a defense to any action
or proceeding to enforce such agreement,
and
(C) shall not constitute a defense to any action
or proceeding for breach of such agreement.
The arrow-diagram of the New York Plain Language statute
*[VOL. 13:3
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a - b -b.. C
- -b- ----- -e - f - g --------
k
The between-sentence structure of this normalized version of
the New York Plain Language statute is explicit and precise, as
well as standardized and simplified. It makes crystal clear
(1) that when conditions a and b are fulfilled, results c
and d occur, and
(2) that when conditions a, b e, f and g are fulfilled,
results h, j, and k occur.
Although there are small wording changes in the constituent
sentences of the normalized version, the principal difference be-
tween it and the present version is the explicitness and precision
of the between-sentence structure. In the present version the
following eighteen structural relationships are left implicit:
(1) that result c is dependent on fulfillment of condition
b,
(2) that result d is dependent on fulfillment of condi-
tion b,
(3) that result h is dependent on fulfillment of condi-
tions b, f, and g,
(4) that results i and k are dependent on fulfillment of
conditions ab e f, and g, and
(5) that result i is dependent on fulfillment of condi-
tions a, b and e.
However, in the normalized version all eighteen of these struc-
tural relationships are made explicit and precise. The interesting
question, of course, is what difference does it produce in terms
of making the statute easier to understand? The answer, which
should interest everyone who wants to make legal documents
clearer, is provided in the next section.
II. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS COMPARING PRESENT AND
NORMALIZED VERSIONS OF THE NEW YORK PLAIN LANGUAGE
STATUTE
The subjects who participated in the experiment to compare
Clear Structure in Legal Drafting
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performance in understanding the New York Plain Language
statute drafted in normalized form with performance in under-
standing the present form of the statute were lay persons, law
students, and lawyers. Half of each of the three groups worked
with the normalized version and the other half worked with the
present version. The groups working with the normalized ver-
sions proceeded in the following sequence:
(1) memorandum on normalization.
(2) normalized version of statute with test questions.
The groups working with the present versions of the statute pro-
ceeded in the following sequence:
(1) present version of statute with test questions.
(2) memorandum on normalization.
The memorandum on normalization (Appendix A) is intended
to familiarize the subjects with provisions written in normalized
form and to provide some practice in working with such provi-
sions. When subjects finished the first phase of the experiment,
they handed in their results and received the materials for the
second phase. A record of the time spent on each phase was re-
corded. All subjects attempted to answer the same ten questions
(Appendix B) on the basis of the version of the statute that they
had available. The questions were all of the same form. A set of
conditions was given along with a set of results, and the subjects
were asked to indicate which of the results occurred by virtue of
the statutory provision when all of the given conditions were ful-
filled. Performance of the subjects was compared on the basis of
their accuracy and speed in answering the ten questions.'
Results on similar comparisons of performance on normalized and present versions
of sections of the Internal Revenue Code indicate that law students perform about 20%
faster and about 30% more accurately when using normalized versions than when using
present versions. Results of pilot experiments with law students on the New York Plain
Language statute show even greater differences in accuracy, but no differences in speed.
These pilot results tend to be confirmed by the partial data now available from 89 sub-
jects in the full experimental run, which show that all three groups - lawyers, law stu-
dents and lay persons - work about 80% more accurately when the statute is expressed
in normalized form than they do when it is expressed in its current form, with no signifi-
cant change in the time taken to analyze and answer the questions. Thus, preliminary
analysis of the New York Plain Language statute data indicates that normalizing the
statute would substantially improve the accuracy with which relevant groups of persons
read and understand it, at no sacrifice in time spent.
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III. THE PERVASIVENESS OF STRUCTURAL AMBIGUITY
The presence of structural ambiguity in written legal materi-
als is surprisingly frequent. Unlike the uncertainty that is delib-
erately incorporated in statutes, regulations, and other legal doc-
uments by the conscious choice of vague terms, the uncertainty
that results from structural ambiguity appears in most instances
to be inadvertent. It is surprising that a profession that holds
itself out as expert in the art of communicating so frequently
produces written legal documents that are so riddled with inad-
vertent structural ambiguity. Lawyers are probably more sensi-
tive than any other professional group to the semantic dimen-
sion of a written message, but they have a definite blind spot
with respect to the structural dimension. Very few law students
are exposed to the relevant knowledge for skillfully handling
structural problems, because instruction in modern logic is still a
rarity in American law schools. The somewhat detailed consider-
ation of one example, the term "unless," indicates why some
training in modern logic is so useful. The problem of structural
ambiguity is a subtle and complex one that simply is not han-
dled adequately by common sense alone.
In a seminar on Symbolic Logic and Legal Communication, I
indicate to the participants that grades will depend upon three
things: weekly homework problems, a final examination, and a
seminar paper. I further indicate:
Students will not receive A's, unless they write good sem-
inar papers.
The context in which the "unless" appears in the above state-
ment makes it clear just what structure the use of the term is
intended to convey. Abbreviating its constituent sentences by
the letters "a" and "c," the form of the sentence is:
a, unless c.
The "unless" is clearly intended as a "weak" unless, rather than
as a "strong" unless. It is meant to assert merely:
If not c then a.
It is not meant to assert the stronger proposition:
If not c then a, and if c then not a.
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The first proposition is stronger than the second in the sense
that the second proposition is logically deducible from the first
but not vice-versa. That is, the stronger one says all that the
weaker one says, and also says something more. So interpreted,
the sentence is saying merely:
If they do not write good seminar papers,
then students will not receive A's.
It is not also saying:
If they write good seminar papers,
then students will receive A's.
In this instance the rest of the context makes it clear that
grades depend upon other considerations besides the quality of
the seminar paper. Sometimes, however, the context simply does
not help to determine whether the weak "unless" or the strong
"unless" is intended. In most instances in legal usage, it turns
out to be a strong "unless." But determining whether the "un-
less" is weak or strong is only the threshold question.
This is when the complexity starts. Here, we will consider only
nine examples; a complete analysis of "unless" would be entirely
too lengthy for presentation here. The nine considered are sum-
marized in Figure 1 below. For each instance shown in Figure 1
the "unless" may either be relating constituent sentences to
each other, a sentence-part to a constituent sentence, or sen-
tence-parts to each other.
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Figure 1
Interpretations of "Unless"
Unless
I I
Weak Strong
Int. Int.
1 2
a and b a or b x shall y x may y
consequent consequent consequent' consequent
A B C D
Int. Int. Int. Int. Int. Int. Int. Int.
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
The example involving grades and seminar papers above is an
example of Interpretation 1 of "unless," the weak interpretation,
as is the example below that deals with when a writ of habeas
corpus need not be entertained by federal courts. The other
eight interpretations shown in Figure 1, for which examples are
given below, are Interpretations 2A1, 2A2, 2B1, 2B2, 2C1, 2C2,
2D1, and 2D2.
Interpretation 1
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), which deals with finality of judicial deter-
minations, provides:
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a ma-
terial factual issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an
issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a state court has been denied by a court of the
United States or a justice or judge of the United States
release from custody or other remedy on an application
for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for
a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person
need not be entertained by a court of the United States
or a justice or judge of the United States (x need not y)
unless the application alleges and is predicated on a
factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing
of the earlier application for the writ (c2), and unless
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the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant
has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld
the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ
(c3).5
The between-sentence structure of this provision is of the form:
When cl, x need not y unless c2, and unless c3.
The first occurrence of the term "unless" is clearly intended as a
weak "unless." Appropriately interpreted, the provision does not
provide that alleging a new ground, not adjudicated at the ear-
lier hearing, alone is to be a sufficient condition for requiring
that an application for a writ of habeas corpus be entertained.
Rather, it requires also that the court, justice, or judge be satis-
fied that the applicant has not abused the writ on the earlier
application. The drafter could have stated the intended struc-
ture more clearly in the following form:
When cl, then if and only if c2 and c3 then x shall X.
Interpretation 2A1
The first interpretation of a strong "unless" with a conjunctive
consequent is interpreting a statement of the form:
(a and b) unless c.
Interpretation 2A1 interprets such a form of statement to mean:
If not c then (a and b), and
if c then not (a and b).
which is logically equivalent to:
If not c then (a and b), and
if c then (not a or not b).
and also logically equivalent to:
(a and b) if and only if not c.
The abbreviation that logicians use for "if and only if" is the
- 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1976).
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convenient shorthand term, "IFF." So, Interpretation 2A1 can
be regarded as the IFF interpretation of:
(a and b) unless c.
Notice that the second conjunct of this interpretation has a
consequent that is a disjunction; it is of the form:
not a or not b.
It is extremely rare in legal materials to have results of this
form, in effect, to have at least one of two results (perhaps both)
occur when some conditions are fulfilled, but not specify which
one. So, this Interpretation 2A1 should be expected to be en-
countered only very rarely.
Interpretation 2A2
The second interpretation of a strong "unless" with a conjunc-
tive consequent is also interpreting a statement of the form:
(a and b) unless c.
Interpretation 2A2 interprets a statement of such form to mean:
If not c then (a and b), and
if c then (not a and not b),
which is not logically equivalent to:
(a and b) if and only if not c,
but is stronger than it. Since Interpretation 2A1 is logically
equivalent to this "if and only if" statement, Interpretation 2A2
is a stronger interpretation of "unless" than Interpretation 2A1.
So, it is appropriate to regard Interpretation 2A2 as the IFF+
interpretation of:
(a and b) unless c,
where the definition of IFF+ is:
(a and b) IFF+ not c = df if not c then (a and b), and
if c then (not a and not b).
SPRING 1980]
HeinOnline  -- 13 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 475 1979-1980
Journal of Law Reform
Such an interpretation, in effect, occurred in a statement of
this form in Brekken v. Reader's Digest Special Products, Inc.,6
in which the court was faced with interpreting the following lan-
guage from an employment contract between the parties:
This agreement shall be effective from the date of execu-
tion (al) and shall remain in effect for a period of twelve
months (a2') and will be automatically renewed for
twelve-month terms (b) unless sooner terminated (c').7
Brekken, who was dismissed by his employer within the first
year of his employment, argued that the "unless sooner termi-
nated" language only modified the sentence-part, "will be auto-
matically renewed for twelve-month terms," but not the sen-
tence-part referring to the initial twelve-month period. However,
the court concluded:
It cannot be doubted as plaintiffs assert that they ex-
pected their employment to continue for at least one
year, but that was merely an expectation and not a right
guaranteed by the contracts which they signed. Clearly
the phrase "unless sooner terminated" relates to the
whole sentence of which that phrase is a part. The court
below correctly construed each of these contracts as be-
ing terminable at will.8
Thus, the court decided in effect:
If the agreement is sooner terminated, then it is not so
that it shall remain in effect for a period of twelve
months.
That is:
If c, then not a2,
which is logically deducible from the second conjunct of a varia-
tion of Interpretation 2A2,
If c, then not al and not a2 and not b,
6 353 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1965).
7 Id. at 506.
a Id.
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but would not be logically deducible from Interpretation 2A1.
Interpretation 2A1
1. This agreement shall be effective from the date of execu-
tion, and
2. it shall remain in effect for a period of twelve months, and
3. if and only if
A. it is not sooner terminated, then
B. it will be automatically renewed for twelve-month
terms.
Interpretation 2A2
1. If
A. the agreement is sooner terminated, then
B. it shall be effective from the date of execution, and
C. it shall remain in effect for a period of twelve months,
and
D. it will be automatically renewed for twelve-month
terms, and
2. if
A. the agreement is not sooner terminated, then
B. it is not so that it shall be effective from the date of
execution, and
C. it is not so that it shall remain in effect for a period of
twelve months, and
D. it is not so that it will be automatically renewed for
twelve-month terms.9
Thus the court in effect chose Interpretation 2A2 of the applica-
ble language, because the decision that it made would not have
been logically deducible from the weaker interpretation.
With an appropriate definition of "IF.... THEN ( ... AND.. .), BUT OTHER-
WISE-NOT" Interpretation 2A2 inight be expressed more elegantly as follows:
IF
1. this agreement is not sooner terminated,
THEN
2. it shall be effective from the date of execution, AND
3. it shall remain in effect for a period of twelve months, AND
4. it will be automatically renewed for twelve-month terms, BUT
OTHERWISE-NOT.
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Interpretation 2B1
The first interpretation of a strong "unless" with a disjunctive
consequent is the IFF interpretation of:
(a or b) unless c.
Interpretation 2B1 interprets this form of statement to mean:
If not c then (a or b), and
if c then not (a or b),
which is logically equivalent to:
If not c then (a or b), and
if c then (not a and not b),
and also is logically equivalent to:
(a or b) unless c.
Note that the second conjunct of Interpretation 2B1 (the IFF
interpretation of "(a or b) unless c") is logically equivalent to
the second conjunct of Interpretation 2A2 (the IFF+ interpreta-
tion of "(a and b) unless c"). They both are logically equivalent
to:
If c then (not a and not b).
Thus, Interpretation 2B1 is weaker than Interpretation 2A2, be-
cause 2B1's first conjunct "if not c then (a or b)" is deducible
from 2A2's first conjunct "if not c then (a and b)," but not vice-
versa.
Interpretation 2B1 is neither stronger nor weaker than Inter-
pretation 2A1 (the IFF interpretation of "(a and b) unless c"),
because:
1. the first conjunct of 2B1, "if not c then (a or b)," is
deducible from the first conjunct of 2A1, "if not c
then (a and b)," but not vice-versa and
2. the second conjunct of 2A1, "if c then (not a or not
b)," is deducible from the second conjunct of 2B1, "if
c then (not a and not b)," but not vice-versa.
A variation of a 2B1 Interpretation of "unless" occurs in a
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HeinOnline  -- 13 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 478 1979-1980
Clear Structure in Legal Drafting
New York State statute dealing with sheriffs and constables.
The statute provides that
The sheriff (w) need not attend (x) or designate officers
to attend (y) terms of court in Erie County (z) unless
requested (c'). 10
The within-sentence structure of this provision is of the form:
w need not (x or y) z. unless c'.
The " . . . need not . . . " language of this provision says the
same thing as the" . . . is permitted to not. . . "sense of"...
may not . . . ." Therefore, the second conjunct of this 2B1 In-
terpretation of "unless," namely:
If c, then it is not so that w need not (x or y) z,
says the same thing as:
If c, then it is not so that w is permitted to not (x or y) z,
which, in turn, is logically equivalent to:
If c, then (it is not so that w is permitted to not x z, and
it is not so that w is permitted to not y z),
which, in turn, is logically equivalent to:
If c, then (w shall x z, and w shall y z).
Thus, this provision of the form:
( . . . or . . . ) unless c.
gets the characteristic 2B1 Interpretation of its second conjunct,
namely:
If c, then (not. . . and not.. .
resulting in the following interpretation of the statute:
1. If
A. the sheriff is not requested to do so,
No N.Y. JUD. LAWS § 405 (McKinney 1968).
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then
B. he need not attend or designate officers to attend
terms of court, and
2. if
A. he is requested to do so,
then
B. he shall attend, and
C. he shall designate officers to attend.
Interpretation 2B2
The second interpretation of a strong "unless" with a disjunc-
tive consequent is also interpreting a statement of the form:
(a or b) unless c.
Interpretation 2B2 interprets this form of statement to mean:
If not c then (a or b), and
if c then (not a or not b),
which is not logically equivalent to:
(a or b) if and only if not c,
but weaker than it. Since Interpretation 2B1 is logically
equivalent to this "if and only if" statement, Interpretation 2B2
is a weaker interpretation of "unless" than Interpretation 2B1.
So, it is appropriate to regard Interpretation 2B2 as the IFF-
interpretation of:
(a or b) unless c.
Note, however, that the second conjunct of Interpretation 2B2
(the IFF- interpretation of "(a or b) unless c") is logically
equivalent to the second conjunct of Interpretation 2A1 (the IFF
interpretation of "(a and b) unless c"). They both are logically
equivalent to:
If c then (not a or not b),
where the definition of IFF- is:
(a or b) IFF- not c =df if not c then (a or b), and
if c then (not a or not b).
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Thus, Interpretation 2B2 is weaker than Interpretation 2A1, be-
cause 2B2's first conjunct "if not c then (a or b)" is deducible
from 2A1's first conjunct "if not c then (a and _b)," but not vice-
versa.
Like Interpretation 2A1, Interpretation 2B2 has a second con-
junct that has a consequent that is a disjunction. This interpre-
tation should be expected to be encountered only very rarely,
because statutes, regulations, and other norms rarely have dis-
junctive consequences.
Interpretation 2C1
The first interpretation of a strong "unless" with a normative
consequent imposing an obligation interprets a statement of the
form:
x shall y unless c.
Interpretation 2C1 interprets this form of statement to mean:
If not c then x shall y, and
if c then it is not so that x shall y,
which is logically equivalent to:
x shall y if and only if not c.
Thus, it is appropriate to regard Interpretation 2C1 as the IFF
interpretation of:
x shall y unless c.
Such an interpretation occurred in Farmer v. Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co.,11 where the Court was faced with interpreting the
language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) (among other
things) which provides: "Except when express provision there-
fore is made either in a statute of the United States or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs . . . . " Since there were no
express contrary provisions, the Court concerned itself with the
latter part of the rule that reads:
costs shall be allowed as of course to the
379 U.S. 227, 235-36 (1964).
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prevailing party (x shall y) unless the court otherwise di-
rects. . . .(c)
In holding that the trial court judge acted properly by allowing
only partial costs of a prevailing litigant, the Court declared:
"Therefore, the discretion given district judges to tax costs
should be sparingly exercised with reference to expenses not
specifically allowed by statute . . . . We therefore hold that
judge Weinfeld's order assessing only appropriate expenses
should have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals." Thus, the
Court decided:
If the court otherwise directs, then it is not so that costs
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party,
which is the second conjunct of Interpretation 2C1 (the IFF in-
terpretation of "x shall y unless c"), whose interpretation is:
If not c, then x shall y, and
if c, then it is not so that x shall y.
Thus, the Court in effect chose Interpretation 2C1 of the appli-
cable language, because the stronger interpretation, Interpreta-
tion 2C2, would have prohibited the award of the partial costs
that were approved.
Interpretation 2C2
The second interpretation of a strong "unless" that interprets
a statement of the form:
x shall y unless c,
is Interpretation 2C2, which interprets this form of statement to
mean:
If not c then x shall y, and
if c then x shall not y,
which is not logically equivalent to:
x shall y if and only if not c,
but stronger than it. Since Interpretation 2C1 is logically
equivalent to this "if and only if" statement, Interpretation 2C2
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is a stronger interpretation of "unless" than Interpretation 2C1.
So, it is appropriate to regard Interpretation 2C2 as the IFF+
interpretation of:
x shall y unless c,
where the definition of IFF+ in this context is:
x shall y IFF+ not c -df if not c then x shall y, and
if c then x shall not y.
There are two variations of Interpretation 2C2, namely: 2C2'
and 2C2". They are interpretations like 2C2 but are interpreta-
tions of the forms:
x shall not y unless not c
and
x shall not y unless c,
respectively.
A variation of Interpretation 2C2 occurs in a provision cited in
State Bar Grievance Administrator v. Woll. 2 The relevant part
of the provision is:
"an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's in-
stance (x shall not y) unless by order of the court upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper
(c')."0 1
The provision is of the form:
x shall not y unless c',
and its appropriate interpretation is a 2C2" Interpretation,
which is:
If not c then x shall not y, and
if c then x shall y.
By Interpretation 2C2" the provision is being interpreted as
11 401 Mich. 155 (1977).
13 GEN. CT. R. § 504.1(2) (1963).
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asserting:
1. If
A. the court does not order dismissal of an action upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper,
then
B. the action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
instance, and
2. if
A. the court orders dismissal of an action,
then
B. the action shall be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper.
Interpretation 2D1
The first interpretation of a strong "unless" with a normative
consequent extending permission is interpreting a statement of
the form:
x may y unless c.
Interpretation 2D1 interprets this form of statement to mean:
If not c then x may y, and
if c then it is not so that x may y,
which is logically equivalent to:
x may y if and only if not c.
Thus, it is appropriate to regard Interpretation 2D1 as the IFF
interpretation of:
x may y unless c.
There is an interesting relationship between Interpretation 2D1
and the 2C1' variation of Interpretation 2C1. This variation in-
terprets a statement of the form:
x shall not y unless not c.
Interpretation 2C1' interprets this form of statement to mean:
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If not c then it is not so that x shall not y, and
if c then x shall not y,
which is logically equivalent to:
If not c then x may y, and
if c then it is not so that x may y.
Thus, Interpretation 2D1 (the IFF interpretation of "x may y
unless c") is logically equivalent to Interpretation 2C1 (the IFF
interpretation of "x shall not y unless not c"), because both are
logically equivalent to:
x may y if and only if not c.
Interpretation 2C2 (the IFF + interpretation of "x shall y unless
c") is stronger than Interpretation 2D1 (the IFF interpretation
of "x may y unless c"), because
1. their second conjuncts, "if c then x shall not y" and
"if c then it is not so that x may y," are logically
equivalent, and
2. the first conjunct of 2D1, "if not c then x may y," is
deducible from the first conjunct of 2C2, "if not c
then x shall y," but not vice-versa.
The relationships between Interpretations 2C1, 2C1', 2C2, and
2D1 can be summarized by
2C2
2C1 2D1 * 2C1'
where "x -" y indicates "x is stronger than y,"
and "x - y" indicates "x is logically equivalent to y."
A 2D1 Interpretation of "unless" occurs in 28 U.S.C. § 1732
which deals with records made in the regular course of business
and provides in pertinent part:
If any business, institution, member of a profession or
calling, of any department or agency of government, in
the regular course of business or activity has kept or re-
corded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, represen-
tation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, oc-
currence, or event, and in the regular course of business
has caused any or all of the same to be recorded, copied,
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or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, micro-
film, micro-card, minature photographic, or other process
which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium
for so reproducing the original, the original may be de-
stroyed in the regular course of business (x may y) un-
less its preservation is required by law (c2).14
This provision's between-sentence structure is of the form:
If cl, then x may y unless c2.
The 2D1 Interpretation of the consequent is of the form:
If not c2 then x may y, and
if c2 then it is not so that x may y,
which is logically equivalent to:
If and only if not c2, then x may y.
Thus, the 2D1 Interpretation of the consequent of the provision
is:
If and only if
1. the original's preservation is not required by law,
then
2. it may be destroyed in the regular course of business.
Interpretation 2D2
The second interpretation of a strong "unless" that interprets
a statement of the form:
x may y unless c,
is Interpretation 2D2, which interprets this form of statement to
mean:
If not c then x may y, and
if c then x may not y.
Unfortunately, in ordinary language a statement of the form "x
may not y" is interpreted most frequently as "x must not y."
1 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976).
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This is unfortunate because it blurs the distinction between "x
may not y" and "x shall not y." In one version of the proposed
new bankruptcy legislation, for example, "x may not y" is by
definition stipulated to have this unfortunate ordinary language
interpretation, blurring a distinction that is central to the clear
understanding of normative prose. The other interpretation of
"x may not y," which is the one intended in the second part of
Interpretation 2D2, is "x is permitted to not y." Since this sec-
ond interpretation of "x may not y" is logically equivalent to:
It is not so that x shall y.
Interpretation 2D2 is logically equivalent to:
If not c then x may y, and
if c then it is not so that x shall y,
which is not logically equivalent to:
If and only if not c, then x may y,
but is weaker than it. Since Interpretation 2D1 is logically
equivalent to this "if and only if" statement, Interpretation 2D2
is a weaker interpretation of "unless" than Interpretation 2D1.
So, it is appropriate to regard Interpretation 2D2 as the IFF-
interpretation of:
x may y unless c,
where the definition of IFF- in this context is:
x may y IFF- not c =df if not c then x may y, and
if c then it is not so that
x shall y.
Thus,
2C2
2C1, .. 2Dl - -- 2C1'
2D2 4
There is a 2D2 Interpretation of "unless" in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2461(b), which deals with modes of recovery for seizures of
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property within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States. The provision reads:
Unless otherwise provided by Act of Congress (ci)
whenever a forfeiture of property is prescribed as a pen-
alty for violation of an Act of Congress (c2) and the
seizure takes place on the high seas or on navigable wa-
ters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of
the United States (c3), such forfeiture may be enforced
by libel in admiralty (x may y) but in cases of seizures
on land (c4) the forfeiture may be enforced by a pro-
ceeding by libel which shall conform as near as may be
to proceedings in admiralty (w may z). 15
Its form is:
Unless ci', whenever c2 and c3, x may y but in cases of
c4' w may z.
The form of the relevant part is:
Unless ci', . . . x may y.
The form of Interpretation 2D2 of this part is:
If not cl then .. . x may y, and
if c then . . . x may not y. ("may not" in the sense of
"need not")
Thus, the 2D2 Interpretation of the provision is:
1. If
A. it is not otherwise provided by Act of Congress,
then
B. such forfeiture may be enforced by libel in admiralty,
and
2. if
A. it is otherwise provided by Act of Congress,
then
B. such forfeiture need not be enforced by libel in
admiralty.
This, of course, assumes that the provision otherwise by Act of
1" Id. § 2461(b) (1976).
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Congress specifies that enforcement need not be by libel in ad-
miralty. If the Act of Congress providing otherwise specifies that
the enforcement must be by libel in admiralty, then the appro-
priate interpretation would be a 2D1 Interpretation. This high-
lights the ambiguity of "providing otherwise" than an "x may y"
result by an Act of Congress. The "provision otherwise" may
specify:
x shall refrain from doing y,
or it may only specify the weaker:
x may refrain from doing y.
But both are "provisions otherwise" and they lead to different
interpretations.
Interpretation 2D2 (the IFF- interpretation of "x may y un-
less c") is weaker than Interpretation 2C1 (the IFF interpreta-
tion of "x shall y unless c"), because
1. the second conjunct of 2D2, "if c then x may not y,"
(the "need not" sense of "may not") is logically
equivalent to the second conjunct of 2C1, "if c then it
is not so that x shall y," and
2. the first conjunct of 2D2, "if not c then x may y," is
deducible from the first conjunct of 2C1, "if not c
then x shall y," but not vice-versa.
Interpretation 2D2 also has an interesting relationship to In-
terpretation 2D2' (the IFF- interpretation of "x may not i.e.,
need not y unless not c"). They are logically equivalent to each
other because both are logically equivalent to:
If not c then x may y, and
if c then it is not so that x shall y.
There are also some other interesting relationships of this
sort. Interpretation 2C1 (the IFF interpretation of "x shall y un-
less c") is logically equivalent to Interpretation 2D1' (the IFF
interpretation of "x may not y unless not c") because both are
logically equivalent to:
x shall y if and only if not c.
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Also, Interpretation 2C2 (the IFF+ interpretation of "x shall y
unless c") is logically equivalent to Interpretation 2C2' (the
IFF+ interpretation of "x shall not y unless not c"), because
both are logically equivalent to:
If not c then x shall y, and
if c then x shall not y.
In summary, where
" indicates "is logically equivalent to"
and " - " indicates "is stronger than"
2C1
IFF of
x shall y unless c.
2C2
IFF+ of
x shall y unless c.
2D1
IFF of
x may y unless c.
2D2
IFF- of
x may y unless c.
2D1'
- IFF of
x may not y unless not c.
2C2'
3o. IFF of
x shall not y unless not c.
2C1'
- IFF of
x shall not y unless not c.
2D2'
- IFF- of
x may not y unless not c.
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2A2
"IFF+ of
(a and b) unless c.
2A1
IFF of
(a and b) unless c.
2B1
IFF of
(a or b) unless c.
2B2 r
IFF- of
(a orb) unless c.
2C2
IFF+ of
x shall £ unless C.
2C1
IFF of
x shall y unless c.
2D2
IFF- of
x may y unless a.
2D1
IFF of
.x may y unless c.
HeinOnline  -- 13 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 491 1979-1980
Journal of Law Reform
2C2"
IFF+ of
x shall not y unless c.
2C1" 2D1"
IFF of IFF of
x shall not y unless c. x may noty unless c.
2D2"
IFF- of
x may not y unless c.
In all of the cases considered above as they would occur in
natural prose, there is a question, in effect, about where the pa-
rentheses are intended to be placed. For example:
a and b unless c,
may either be:
(a and b) unless c,
a and (b unless c).
That the problem is a real
man's Estate,16 in which the
the following language:
one is illustrated in In Re Kurtz-
court was faced with interpreting
The degree of kindred shall be computed according to
the rules of the civil law (a), and the kindred of the hali
blood shall inherit equally with those of the whole blood
65 Wash. 2d 260, 396 P.2d 786 (1964).
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in the same degree (b), unless the inheritance comes to
the intestate by descent, devise, or gift from one of his
ancestors, or kindred of such ancestor's blood, in which
case all those who are not of the blood of such ancestors
shall be excluded from such inheritance: (c) ....
The "a and b" provision had been adopted by the first territorial
legislature in 1854. The "unless c" provision was added by the
Washington state legislature in 1945. The question presented in
effect was whether the appropriate interpretation was:
(a and b) unless c,
or
a and (b unless c).
The court in effect chose the latter interpretation.
IV. DEFINING THE STRUCTURAL WORDS
It is possible for legal drafters to make the structure of their
documents clear by using carefully defined structural words to
achieve structure that is explicit and precise. But such clear
structure is rarely encountered because legal drafters rarely de-
fine their structural terms. Instead they rely upon the context to
indicate the appropriate interpretation among competing alter-
natives. Frequently the context will be at war with the interpre-
tation that results from logical deduction. The contextual inter-
pretation will be one that is either stronger than or weaker than
the logical interpretation, as was the case with various examples
of the use of the term "unless" in the prior section. For lawyers
who are already accustomed to dealing with defined terms in
statutes, regulations, and other legal documents, it is a small
step to extend the practice of defining words to include struc-
tural words as well as content words.
At present the most common method for indicating a defined
term in legal text is to capitalize its initial letter and to have its
uncapitalized occurrences indicate usage in an ordinary language
sense. This practice is better than not using any special indica-
tor at all, but it is not entirely satisfactory. In the first place,
when this practice is used and a particular term has been de-
fined, the occurrence of the term with its initial letter capital-
7 Id. at 262, 396 P.2d at 789.
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ized will not always be unambiguous; such an occurrence will not
always indicate its use in the defined sense. There may be gram-
matical reasons why it is capitalized, such as its occurrence as
the first word of the sentence. In those instances it will be un-
clear whether the capitalized term is intended in its defined
sense or in its ordinary language sense. This type of problem is
relatively rare. A second kind of problem is much more perva-
sive. This is the uncertainty that results when such a capitaliza-
tion convention is being used and occurrences of defined terms
are uncapitalized. Such uncapitalized occurrences of defined
terms may indicate any one of the three following sets of
circumstances:
(1) that the drafter
(A) considered the question of whether this oc-
currence of the defined term was intended in
its defined sense or in its ordinary language
sense, and
(B) decided that the course of wisdom in this in-
stance was to communicate clearly to readers
whether this occurrence of the term was in-
tended in its defined sense or in its ordinary
language sense, and
(C) was communicating that the term was in-
tended in its ordinary language sense, or
(2) that the drafter
(A) considered the question of whether this oc-
currence of the defined term was intended in
its defined sense or in its ordinary language
sense, and
(B) decided that the course of wisdom in this in-
stance was not to communicate clearly to
readers whether this occurrence of the term
was intended in its defined sense or in its or-
dinary language sense, but to be ambiguous
as to which and to introduce uncertainty de-
liberately in this respect, or
(3) that the drafter had simply not considered the ques-
tion of whether this occurrence of the defined
termed was intended in its defined sense or in its
ordinary language sense (or did not wish to commu-
nicate his considered choice of whether or not to be
deliberately ambiguous).
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It is helpful in seeking to achieve clear structure to consider a
method for defining structural terms that eliminates both of
these problems and that indicates explicitly and precisely which
of various defined senses of a structural term are intended in
particular occurrences. First, it is useful to have some clear and
unambiguous way to indicate defined terms, such as:
1. using all capitalized letters,
2. using italics,
3. using underlined letters,
4. using boldface letters, and
5. using other means.
They each can be used in a manner that will be explicit, precise,
and unambiguous. We shall use capitalized letters. Thus, for ex-
* ample, "AND" will be used to indicate a defined sense of the
structural term "and," and "OR" will be used to indicate a de-
fined sense of the structural term "or."
Second, it is helpful to have available some precise diagra-
matic notation to indicate "pictures" of structural terms used in
their defined senses. The arrow diagrams used for this purpose
will be simple and easily learned. There is only one thing that
needs to be understood in order to "read" such a picture: each
pathway between the tail of an arrow,">-," and the head of an
arrow," --*," indicates a sufficient set of conditions for reaching
the set of results to the right of the arrowhead. Although this
arrow diagram notation is simple, it is nevertheless quite sophis-
ticated. It is functionally equivalent to the widely-known paren-
theses-free notation for propositional logic of the Polish logician,
Jan Lukasiewicz. Thus, ">-C -- R" will indicate:
IF the set of conditions indicated by "C" are fulfilled,
THEN the set of results indicated by "R" occur.
Elementary norms are those that have only one set of suffi-
cient conditions and one result. The most simple elementary
norm is the one that has only one condition. An example of such
a simple elementary norm is one of the form:
IF a THEN b,
which is represented by the arrow diagram:
>-, a -- b.
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A slightly more complex elementary norm is one that has
more than one condition in its sufficient set of conditions and
these conditions are conjoined - that is, such conditions are re-
lated to each other by the logical relationship, which is another
way of saying structural relationship, of conjunction, which
(a) will be indicated in text by the term "AND" and
(b) will be indicated in the antecedents of arrow dia-
grams by "-."
An example of a complex elementary norm is one of the form:
IF a AND b THEN c,
which is represented by the arrow diagram:
. -a-b----- > e.
Compound norms are combinations of two or more elementary
norms. There are various kinds of compound norms which are
either
(a) conjunctions of other norms or
(b) logically equivalent to conjunctions of other norms.
One kind of a compound norm is the norm with a conjunctive
consequent. Occurrence of conjunction in a consequent
(a) will be indicated in text by the term "AND" and
(b) will be indicated in arrow diagrams by "[ ."
An example of such a compound norm is one of the form:
IF a THEN (b and c),
which is represented by the arrow diagram:
Lc.
This first example of a compound norm is logically equivalent to
the conjunction of two simple elementary norms of the form:
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HeinOnline  -- 13 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 496 1979-1980
SPRING 1980] Clear Structure in Legal Drafting 497
IF a THEN b, AND IF a THEN c,
which is represented by:
[ > a---- b
A compound norm with a conjunctive consequent is equivalent
to the conjunction of two norms, because its antecedent pathway
leads to each of its two results.
A second kind of compound norm is one with a disjunctive
antecedent. The logical relationship of disjunction
(a) will be indicated in text by the term "OR" and
(b) will be indicated both in the antecedents and conse-
quents of arrow diagrams by "[ E ."
An example of this second kind of compound norm is one. of the
form:
IF a OR b THEN c,
which is represented by:
This example of a compound norm of the second kind is logi-
cally equivalent to the conjunction of two simple elementary
norms of the form:
IF a THEN c, AND IF b THEN c,
which is represented by:
> -a-- ---- C
>-b------ C.
A compound norm with a disjunctive antecedent is equivalent to
the conjunction of two norms, because there are two pathways
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leading to its result.
A third kind of compound norm is one that is a biconditional.
The biconditional relationship
(a) will be indicated in text by the terms "IF AND
ONLY IF. .. THEN. . ." and
(b) will be indicated in arrow diagrams by" >-<
An example of a compound norm of this third kind is one of the
form:
IF AND ONLY IF a THEN b,
which is represented by:
-- - -- b.
This example of a compound norm of the third kind is logically
equivalent to the conjunction of two simple elementary norms of
the form:
__ -Na-----* Nb.
A compound norm that is a biconditional is equivalent to the
conjunction of two norms because it is really an abbreviation for
the pair of norms expressed by the conjunction of a conditional
relationship between a set of conditions and a result, and a sec-
ond conditional relationship between the negation of that set of
conditions and the negation of that result.
The negation of a condition or a result
(a) will be indicated by prefixing the text that expresses
that condition or result by the terms "IT IS NOT
SO THAT" or by inserting the term "NOT" in an
appropriate place in the text and
(b) will be indicated in arrow diagrams by "N."
To keep expressions as simple as possible, only conditionals,
single conditions, and single results will be negated. All other
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negations will be transformed into logically equivalent expres-
sions that contain these three kinds of permitted negations. Ne-
gations of conjunctions will be transformed into disjunctions of
negates, which is to say:
N,
will be transformed and expressed as:
[ Na
Negations of disjunctions will be transformed into conjunctions
of negates, which is to say:
N a -
N b--
will be transformed and expressed as:
[b.
Negations of biconditionals will be transformed into disjunctions
of negates of conditionals, which is to say:
N -----< a-- b
will be transformed and expressed as:
N --. a b
[N >-Na-------Nb
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Finally, there are the conditional relationships that have al-
ready been exemplified several times. The conditional
relationship
(a) will be indicated in text by the terms "IF ...
THEN.. ." and
(b) will be indicated in arrow diagrams by ....
Conditionals may be of simple elementary norms of the form:
IF a AND b THEN c,
represented by:
>- a-b -
or they may be of compound norms that contain examples of
some or all of these five elementary structural relationships, for
example, of the form:
IF (NOT a AND (NOT b OR (c AND d))) THEN (e
AND (IF "NOT f THEN-(g AND h)) AND (IF AND
ONLY IF i THEN j)),
which is represented by:
The horizontal parenthesized version of the form of such a com-
pound conditional can also be expressed in a vertical form
(a) that is a blend of the horizontal version and its rep-
resentation by an arrow diagram and
(b) that achieves the structural function of the paren-
theses by indentations of the left margin and punc-
tuation (periods and right parentheses):
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IF
1. Na, AND
2. A) Nb, OR
B) 1. c, AND
2. d,
THEN
3. e, AND
4. IF
A. Nf,
THEN
B. g, AND
C. h, AND
5. IF AND ONLY IF
A. i,
THEN
B. j.
This vertical form is useful, because it completely parallels the
"normalized" version of a norm and can be used as an outline
abbreviation of a normalized norm.
Normalized versions of norms, which clearly express the be-
tween-sentence structure of the text by explicit and precise in-
dicators, can be achieved by using the five elementary structural
terms summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 2
The Five Elementary Between-Sentence Structural Terms
Structural Indicator Diagrammatic
Relationship in Text Representation
conditional IF ... THEN ... )-- .
conjunction ... AND ...
(consequent) -
conjunction ... AND ...... . ...
(antecedent)
disjunction ... OR ... E ""-i
negation NOT ... N..
biconditional IF AND ONLY IF ... THEN ... >-<... -...
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These five structural terms are sufficient to achieve clarity of
between-sentence structure, but if drafters wish to use other
terms also, those other terms can be explicitly defined in terms
of these five elementary ones. For example, a drafter may wish
to use a defined "WHEN . . . THEN . . ." or a defined
"WHEN AND ONLY... WHEN... THEN..." to clarify
the structure of a statement like the following:
(c) Upon completion of the investigation a copy of the
investigative report will be supplied to both the in-
sured and the insurer. 18
A statement of the following form:
WHEN a THEN b. -df IFaTHENb
within a reasonable time,
can be used to indicate that a term of the form "WHEN a
THEN b" is equal to, by definition, "IF a THEN b within a
reasonable time." The defined term would be represented by:
>-a -- b.
w
Similarly, "WHEN AND ONLY WHEN.
be defined:
.. THEN..."can
WHEN AND ONLY
WHEN a THEN b.
WHEN
=df WHEN
a THEN b, AND
Na THEN Nb.
The defined term would be represented by:
--- < a- b.
With two such definitions available, it is easy to express the clar-
" PENN. CODE, tit. 31, § 61.6(c) (1979).
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ification of whether the "Upon . . . ." statement above was in-
tended to assert the stronger or the weaker of the two.
Similar uncertainties, like those accompanying usage of the
term "unless" exemplified in the previous section, can be re-
solved with stipulated definitions of this sort together with sub-
scripts. The definitions below can be used to indicate the struc-
tural interpretations listed in the right column.
Defined Term Interpretation
UNLESS Weak "unless"
UNLESSw Strong FF "unless"
UNLESS + Strong IFF+ "unless"
UNLESS -
UNLESS ii
UNLESS i+
UNLESS i-
Strong IFF- "unless"
Strong IFF "unless" with respect to both items
(For example, in "(a AND x shall y) UNLESS
c' the "UNLESS ii" indicates the strong IFF
interpretation of "unless" with respect to the
'and' and the strong IFF interpretation with
respect to the "shall."
Strong IFF "unless" with respect to *he first
item and strong IFF+ "unless" with respect
to the second
Strong IFF "unless" with respect to the first
item and strong IFF- "unless" with respect
to the second
UNLESS +i Strong IFF+ "unless" with respect to the first
item and strong IFF "unless" with respect to
the second
UNLESS ++
UNLESS +_
Strong IFF+ "unless" with respect to both items
Strong IFF+ "unless" with respect to the first
item and strong IFF- "unless" with respect
to the second
UNLESS - Strong IFF- "unless" with respect to the first
item and strong IFF "unless" with respect to
the second
UNLESS - + Strong IFF- "unless" with respect to the first
item and strong IFF+ "unless" with respect
to the second
UNLESS _ Strong IFF- "unless" with respect to both items
Strong IFF+ "unless" with respect to the first
item, strong IFF 'unless' with respect to the
second, and strong IFF- "unless" with respect
to the third
UNLESS +i-
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and so on for the twenty six other "UNLESS's" with triple sub-
scripts and the others with more than three subscripts.
(For example, in "(x shall y AND w may z)
UNLESS± i-c" the "UNLESS+ i -"indicates the
strong IFF+ interpretation of "unless" with
respect to the "shall," the strong IFF interpre-
tation with respect to the "and," and the strong
IFF- interpretation with respect to the "may.")
These notational conventions would lead to definitions such as
the following:
x shall y UNLESSW c.
x shall y UNLESS i c.
x shall y UNLESS+ .
(a AND x shall y)
UNLESSi+ S.
(x shall y AND w may
z) UNLESS+i_ S.
(x shall y AND w may
z) UNLESSi+ i S.
=df IF NOT c THEN x shall y.
=df IF AND ONLY IF NOT c THEN x
shall y.
=df IF NOT c THEN x shall y, AND IF
c THEN x shall NOT y.
=df (If NOT c, THEN a AND x shall y)
AND (IF c, THEN-NOT a OR x shall
NOT y).
=df (IF NOT c, THEN x shall y AND w
may z) AND (IF c, THEN x shall NOT
y OR w MAY NOT z).
=df (IF NOT c, THEN x shall X AND w
may.z) AND (IF c, THEN IT IS NOT
SO THAT x shall y AND IT IS NOT
SO THAT w may z).
etc. for the others.
The uncertainties that arise when a defined term is being used
in an undefined sense can also be resolved by means of a pair of
subscripting conventions: the subscript "o" can be used to indi-
cate an intent to use a defined term in its (o)rdinary language
sense, and the subscript "a," to indicate an intent to be
(a)mbiguous. Thus, the undefined usages of the defined "UN-
LESS" can be clearly indicated by the terms summarized in Ta-
ble 3.
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Table 3
Clear Indicators of Undefined Usages of Defined Terms
Indicator Terms Intended Interpretations
UNLESS o  The defined term "UNLESS" is being used on
this occasion in its ordinary language sense.
UNLESS a The defined term "UNLESS" is being used am-
biguously on this occasion: whether it is more
appropriate to interpret it as being used in
its ordinary language sense or being used in
one of its DEFINED senses is deliberately
left to the reader to interpret from the total
context.
unless The unsubscripted "unless" indicates either
that the writer has simply not consid-
ered the question of which sense he or
she is using the term or
that, although he or she has considered
the question, he or she does not wish
to communicate whether or not the term
is being used ambiguously.
For purposes of most legal drafting tasks it is simpler (and
clearer) just to use the five elementary structural terms rather
than to include additional definitions. Those five are sufficient
for expressing statutes, regulations, and other legal documents
in normalized form and are the best choices for most tasks. Only
for rare and relatively complex tasks will addition of the com-
plexity of more definitions be worthwhile and ultimately result
in a clearer document.
CONCLUSION
At present most legal drafters are little better than rank ama-
teurs in handling the structure of the texts they draft. Their
performance in dealing with structure simply does not pass mus-
ter. There are relevant intellectual skills that can help improve
this embarrassing, disgraceful, and irresponsible performance,
which perfiaps in the not too distant future will also be legally
vulnerable.19 It is long past the time that these skills should be
mastered by those entrusted with performing one of society's
most sensitive tasks. Understanding of, and deftness in the use
of some of the techniques of modern logic are central among the
' Note, Attorney Malpractice in California: The Liability of a Lawyer Who Drafts
an Imprecise Contract or Will, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 422 (1976).
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skills relevant for improving the structure of legal drafting.
Bringing logic to bear will not remove all uncertainty from legal
documents. That is neither possible nor would it be wise.
Desirable flexibility can be deliberately retained by the choice of
general or vague content words, but the inadvertent uncertain-
ties that slip in by way of inept handling of structural aspects
will be minimized. In the quest for structure that is so clear that
language may be truly plain, insight about need alone is not
enough. Those bent on meaningful reform must master the rele-
vant intellectual skills. It may also help to seek the serenity to
accept the things that cannot be changed, the courage and abil-
ity to change those things that should be, and the wisdom to
know the difference.
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Appendix A
NORMALIZED STATUTES
b
the logical
relationships
expressed by those
words are indicated
by a logic diagram
d
a normalized
version of the
statute can
easily be
constructed
logical words
IF in statutes are ANI
standardized
D OR THEN AND
C e
those relationships the expression of
are indicated by the statute can
the itemization of be thereby
a normalized clarified.
outline
© The following is such a logic diagram of GO:>_a__J j_ [d
Each pathway between the > and the -oin the diagram represents
a sufficient set of conditions for reaching the results to the right of the - 3..
Thus a-b and a-c each represent sufficient sets of conditions for getting to
result d and to result e.
MO The following is an itemized normalized outline of 01
IF (The itemization is the shaded part. A pair of
i(a), AND numerals or capital letters followed by a pair of
(b), OR periods accompanies AND-connections between sen-
' (c), tences, whereas a pair of numerals or capital let-
THEN ters followed by a pair of right parentheses accom-
'N(d), AND panies OR-connections.)
( The following is a normalized version of (9:
IF
logical words in a statute are standardized, AND
- the logical relationships expressed by those words are indicated by a
logic diagram, OR
those relationships are indicated by the itemization of a normalized
outline,
THEN
a normalized version of the statute can easily be constructed, AND
t the expression of the statute can thereby be clarified.
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® ) and ( exemplify four of the eight standardized ways of indicating logical
relationships between sentences. The complete list of the logical words and
their diagrammatic representations follows:
1. ... AND ... (between conditions) .... ...
2 ... AND ... (between results) [
3. OR ... L }
4. NOT... N ...
5 ... IF... use
with
single
6.... IF AND ONLY IF ... results
use
7. IF ... THEN... with
multiple
8. IF AND ONLY IF ... THEN... ----. ... results
Consider the following arrow diagram of a statute;
One pathway leading to result d is a-b.
A. What is the other pathway leading to d, and what two pathways lead
to e?
(See answers below.)
The combinations of circumstances that define a situation are specified by
sets of fulfilled conditions. To distinguish combinations from pathways, the
sets of letters that represent such combinations are enclosed in parentheses.
Do each of the following combinations lead to result e by virtue of the statute
above?
B. (a)
C. (a-b) If yes, by virtue of which pathway?
D. (a-b-c))
0 Sometimes a result in a statute is itself a complex " ... then ..." statement.
For example:
>-a-b),l>d 
i
The combination (a-b) leads to result c by the a-b pathway, but it does not
lead to result e, because it is not specified whether d or Nd is the case in
(a-b). Because the statute represented is equivalent to:[- a-b --- c
>-a ---I d-- -oe
Answers to @ :
A. c, and a-b, c.
B. No.
C. Yes, by a-b.
D. Yes, by a-b and by c.
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condition d must also be fulfilled to reach result e. Which results (by which
pathways) does combination (a-b-d) lead to by virtue of this statute? (See
answers below.)
8 There are two steps in using a normalized statute to determine whether given
legal results occur by virtue of that statute in a specified situation:
Step 1 Determine the combination that represents the circumstances of
that situation.
Step 2 Determine whether that combination fulfills the conditions of one
of the pathways of the arrow diagram of that normalized statute.
® Consider the following normalized statute, the corresponding arrow diagram,
and the given factual situation:
IF
a 1. a person is convicted of assault,
THEN
b 2. that person shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than six nor more
than ten years, AND
3. IF
c A) the assault was committed with a firearm, OR
d B) the person has a prior felony conviction,
THEN
e c) that person shall not be eligible for parole during the first five years
of imprisonment.
a b
convictedprs
>-of 61
assault. year c
committed
with a e
firearm 
no paroles
for first
5 years
prior
felony
convicted
THE SITUATIONJones, who on two prior occasions had been convicted of a felony, was
arrested and tried for aggravated assault stemming from a knifing inci-
dent. After many trial delays, he was ultimately convicted on a lesser
charge of assault. Which results occur by virtue of the statute above?
THE ANALYSIS
Step 1 The combination that represents the situation is (a-d), i.e.,
a. convicted of assault, and
d. prior felony conviction
Answers to ® :
To result c by a-b; and to result e by a-b-d.
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Step 2 Combination (a-d) leads to result b by pathway a, and to result e
by pathway a-d.
See how well you understand the interpretation of arrow diagrams by working
through the following example and comparing your answers with those given
below. Where you differ, be sure you understand why the answer given is
;correct.
In each case, which results occur by virtue of the statute above? By which
pathway? (Check each one as you do it, reading both the positive and nega-
tive parts of the answer carefully and being sure that you understand why
the non-occurring results fail to occur.)
A. (a-b-e-h-j-m-n)
B. (a-b-c-f-j-k-m)
C. (a-c-e-g-h-k-m-p)
D. (b-c-e-f-j-k-m-q)
E. (a-b-f-j-k-n-p)
F. (a-b-c-g-j-k-m-q)
Answers to (@:
A. d by a-b; i by a-b-e. But not 1 (k is necessary), nor o (k is necessary),
nor r (p or q is necessary).
B. d by a-b and by a-c; i by a-b-f and by a-c-f; I by a-b-f-j-k and by
a-c-f-j-k; o by a-b-f-j-k-m and by a-c-f-j-k-m. But not r (p or q is
necessary).
C. d by a-c; i by a-c-e and by a-c-g-h; r by a-c-e-p and by a-c-g-h-p. But
not I nor o (j is necessary).
D. None. (a is necessary for each of the results).
E. d by a-b; i by a-b-f; 1 by a-b-f-i-k; o by a-b-f-i-k-n; r by j*
F. d by a-b and by a-c. But not i nor I nor o nor r (e or f or h is
necessary).
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Appendix B
1. FIRST fill out the biographical information.
NAME: CLASS YEAR 1st 2nd 3rd
ADDRESS: TELEPHONE:
2. THEN mark here the last number written on the board. - F [
3. THEN use Sheet 2 to answer the questions below.
PROBLEMS
Given
a. that a consumer signed a 25-year home mortgage agreement with a
savings bank on February 20, 1979 for purchase of a new family resi-
dence,
b. that the savings bank did not make a good faith effort to use a mortgage
agreement that was appropriately captioned by its various sections, and
the form actually used was confusing to the consumer as a result, and
c. that after January, 1981, the consumer refused to make further pay-
ments, claiming that he was misled by the prepayment terms stated in
the agreement,
which of the f~llowing results occur by virtue of the quoted parts of Section
5-701 ?
d. The agreement must be written in non-technical language
and in a clear and coherent manner using words with com- yes no
mon and every day meanings ........................... 1. -
e. The savings bank shall be liable to the consumer in an
amount equal to the sum of the actual damages plus $50.. 2. El [-
f. Even if (b) is a violation, it shall not constitute a de-
fense to any action or proceeding to enforce the agreement. 3. El []
Given
a. that a consumer signed a written agreement on July 31, 1978 for the
purchase of a $450 household freezer and a quantity of frozen food,
b. that the agreement used words in a technical sense and outside their
common and every day meanings, in spite of the seller's good faith
attempt to comply with the requirements of Section 5-701 with respect
to how agreements are to be written, and
c. that two months later the consumer brought suit claiming that the
seller had delivered a defective freezer and no freezer food,
does the following result occur by virtue of the quoted parts of Section 5-701?
d. Even if (b) is a violation, it shall not render the agree- yes no
m ent void or voidable . ................................. 4. El 0l
SPRING 1980]
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Given
a. that a consumer agreed in writing on October 24, 1978 to purchase a
Sky Stream travel trailer from the local dealer for $8500 to use on a
trip to the Rockies,
b. that the dealer made no attempt to comply with Section 5-701, but merely
copied the complicated technical language from a similar agreement
that he used in the sale of boat trailers, and
c. that the consumer sued the dealer shortly afterwards on the grounds
that the dealer had not delivered a special refrigerator unit with the
trailer as promised in the writing,
does the following result occur by virtue of the quoted parts of Section 5-701?
d. The seller shall be liable to the buyer in an amount equal
to the sum of the actual damages plus $50 .............. 5. yes no
Given
a. that a borrower entered into a written agreement for a $5,000 loan from
a bank,
b. that the bank did not in good faith attempt to draft the agreement in
a clear and coherent manner, and the document the borrower signed was
unclear and filled with technical language, and
c. that the borrower sued the bank before completing his loan repayment
claiming that the loan agreement was poorly drafted and unconscion-
able,
does the following result occur by virtue of the quoted parts of Section 5-701?
d. The agreement must be appropriately divided and cap-
tioned by its various sections .......................... 6. yes no
0l El
Given
a. that a consumer signed a written agreement on July 31, 1978 to pur-
chase a yacht for personal and family use,
b. that the agreement was written in complex technical language since the
seller did not make a good faith effort to rewrite an older, standard
form agreement, and
c. that on October 1, 1978 the consumer brought suit to rescind the contract
because the seller failed to deliver the yacht when promised even
though the buyer had put the $55,000 purchase money in escrow as
agreed,
does the following result occur by virtue of the quoted parts of Section 5-701?
d. Even if (b) is a violation, it shall not constitute a defense
to any action or proceeding for breach of such agreement. . 7. yes no
El El
Given
a. that a consumer signed a written agreement in September 7, 1978 to
enroll in a group health insurance plan providing for benefits up to a
maximum of $50,000 for payment of $155 annual premiums,
b. that the instrument he signed was a complicated form agreement using
technical language, and
c. that one week later the buyer decided not to enroll in the health insur-
ance plan, because he was unsure of the financial condition of the in-
surance company,
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which of the following results occur by virtue of the quoted parts of Section
5-701?
d. Even if (b) is a violation, it shall not render the agreement yes no
void or voidable . . ..................................... 8. 0 0l
e. The agreement must be appropriately divided and captioned
by its various sections . ................................ 9. 0l El
Given
a. that a 3-year lease agreement is entered into for rental of a building for
non-residential purposes at the rate of $1,000 per month,
b. that the agreement was made on July 31, 1978, but on December 12, 1981
the lessee brought suit claiming damages and $50 on the grounds that
the lessor failed to repair a leaky roof, and
c. that the lessor has not make a good faith effort to write the lease in
non-technical language, and it is not so written,
does the following result occur by virtue of the quoted parts of Section 5-701?
d. Even if (c) is a violation, it shall not constitute a defense to yes no
any action or proceeding to enforce such agreement ....... 10. 0 El
I Please mark here the last time number written on the board. 1 I Z
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